Towards a Resilient Server with an external VMI in the Virtualization Environment by Utomo, Agus Priyo et al.
EMITTER International Journal of Engineering Technology 
ISSN: 2443-1168, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 2020, pp. 49~66  
DOI : 10.24003/emitter.v7i2.468     
Copyright © 2020 EMITTER International Journal of Engineering Technology - Published by EEPIS 
49 
Towards a Resilient Server with an External VMI in the 
Virtualization Environment 
 
 
Agus Priyo Utomo, Idris Winarno, Iwan Syarif 
 
Departement of Information and Computer Engineering, 
Politeknik Elektronika Negeri Surabaya 
Jl. Raya ITS Sukolilo Surabaya 60111, Indonesia 
E-mail: agusp@poliwangi.ac.id, {idris, iwanarif}@pens.ac.id 
 
 
Received December 31, 2019; Revised May 3, 2020; Accepted May 25, 2020 
 
Abstract 
 
Currently, cloud computing technology is implemented by many 
industries in the world. This technology is very promising due to 
many companies only need to provide relatively smaller capital for 
their IT infrastructure. Virtualization is the core of cloud computing 
technology. Virtualization allows one physical machine to runs 
multiple operating systems. As a result, they do not need a lot of 
physical infrastructures (servers). However, the existence of 
virtualization could not guarantee that system failures in the guest 
operating system can be avoided. In this paper, we discuss the 
monitoring of hangs in the guest operating system in a virtualized 
environment without installing a monitoring agent in the guest 
operating system. There are a number of forensic applications that 
are useful for analyzing memory, CPU, and I/O, and one of it is called 
as LibVMI. Drakvuf, black-box binary analysis system, utilizes LibVMI 
to secure the guest OS. We use the LibVMI library through Drakvuf 
plugins to monitor processes running on the guest operating system. 
Therefore, we create a new plugin to Drakvuf to detect Hangs on the 
guest operating system running on the Xen Hypervisor. The 
experiment reveals that our application is able to monitor the guest 
operating system in real-time. However, Extended Page Table (EPT) 
violations occur during the monitoring process. Consequently, we 
need to activate the altp2m feature on Xen Hypervisor by minimizing 
EPT violations. 
  
Keywords: Virtualization, Virtual Machines Introspection, out-VMI, 
Hang Detection, Cloud Computing. 
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Information technology is growing very fast so that new technologies 
are rapidly replacing current projections. One of them as cloud computing 
technology, which offers easy access, efficiency, and scalability of network 
resources. As a result, cloud computing has made many industries migrating 
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their IT infrastructure to it. Cloud computing is also able to change the 
lifestyles of the world community, many of which they associate with 
technology (e.g., IoT), and even they also visualize it in the form of mobile 
applications. Simply by using a computer or mobile phone, they can do many 
things such as reading news, teaching and learning activities, buying and 
selling transactions, turning off remote lights, and even they are able to 
control the growth of crops in the agricultural sector (e.g. agrotechnology). In 
2021, it is estimated that the data stored in the data center will reach 1.3 ZB, 
up 4.6 times from the previous 286 EB in 2016, this is a finding of the Cisco 
Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast (2016 to 2021) [1]. With more and more 
people and objects connected to each other, we need a connecting medium 
called an information system. There are some components in information 
system and one of the essential parts called computer server. Therefore, the 
availability of the servers is very important to avoid companies from revenue 
loss when access to data resources and business applications is hampered 
[2]. Building a server can be done with a traditional model and can also use a 
virtualization model. Traditional server architecture is different from 
virtualization server architecture as shown in Figure 1. 
Traditional servers are also known as bare-metal servers. Each 
traditional server consists of physical devices in the form of memory, 
processor, I/O, network connection, hard drive, and operating system (OS) to 
run programs and applications. The OS works directly on physical devices 
that depend entirely on the availability of supporting hardware resources. 
Unlike virtualization servers, this operates in a "multi-tenant" environment, 
which means that multiple virtual machines (VMs) runs on the same physical 
hardware. In this case, the computing resources of the physical server are 
virtualized and shared among all the VMs that run it. The virtualization 
server architecture is a bit more complicated than a physical server. This 
requires a hypervisor, which is used to create and manage VMs, which have 
their own virtual computing resources. Furthermore, we can create several 
guest OS and application servers on top of virtual hardware. 
 
Figure 1. Traditional Architecture vs Virtualization Architecture 
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The hypervisor is divided into two types, namely Bare Metal (Native) 
and Hosted. Native hypervisor type runs concurrently with server hardware, 
so it has direct access rights to the hardware without having to pass another 
operating system. That is, it does not require another operating system to run 
this type of Hypervisor (e.g., VMware ESXi, Xen Server). Hosted hypervisor 
type acts as software that is useful for running and managing virtual 
machines, so to get access to the hardware must pass through the operating 
system (e.g., Proxmox, VirtualBox, Xen Hypervisor, KVM Hypervisor). Thus, 
server virtualization makes it possible to run multiple OS and applications 
based on shared physical hardware, which makes it a cost-effective choice for 
building servers rather than traditional servers [21]. 
The impact is that many traditional server users switch to virtualization 
servers, this is due to the many tangible benefits offered by the virtualization 
model including ease of use and scalability [3]. The Cisco Global Cloud Index 
estimates [1] that, in 2021, the ongoing transition from workloads and 
calculation of traditional data center instances to cloud data centers is 94%, 
as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Workload and compute instance distribution [1] 
 
However, shifting the infrastructure from traditional servers to 
virtualization does not guarantee that the server will avoid potential failures 
or other new threats. Consequently, the more new features or services will 
deliver, more potential failures that occur such as Hang (system failure), 
Denial of Service (DoS), and Malware (Hidden Rootkit) [4][5]. Virtual 
Machine Introspection (VMI) is a solution that can be used to solve the 
problems that occur in virtual machines and create a resilient computing 
ecosystem. 
 
2. RELATED WORKS 
The VMI concept was first introduced by Garfinkel and Rosenblum in 
2003 [6]. Then according to Zhao et al. [7] this technique is distinguished 
according to how it works namely in-VMI is a monitoring technique from 
within the guest OS, the detection application acts as an agent that can be run 
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manually or as a service on the operating system, whose task is to monitor 
the system that is running on the guest OS. And out-VMI is a guest OS 
monitoring technique without installing an application (agent) inside the 
guest OS. The more guest OS running on the host OS, the more efficient this 
method is. Many different VMI techniques have been developed in the last 
few years, starting with the introduction of the semantic gap problem. It can 
be concluded that in the case of developing computational security, the use of 
VMI has received a serious response [6][8]. 
In the operating system, there is a paging mechanism, one of which is 
Second Level Address Translation (SLAT). SLAT serves to bridge the virtual 
address of the guest OS with physical memory, and SLAT is also referred to as 
an additional layer that mappings the address from the guest OS to physical 
memory. This technology was initiated by Intel since the Core i3 processor 
until now under the codename Nehalem. Then AMD introduced the same 
technology since the third-generation Opteron under the name Rapid 
Virtualization Indexing (RVI) technology. At present, both Intel Virtualization 
Technology (VT-x) and AMD Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) have utilized 
SLAT technology for virtualization needs, which later on Intel processors 
known as Extended Page Tables (EPT) which are used for Memory 
Management Units (MMU) [9]. 
In the virtualization mechanism, EPT mapping Guest Virtual Address 
(GVA) to be used on the Guest Physical Address (GPA) in the main memory. 
Each guest OS has a one-page table that is managed by a Virtual Machine 
Monitor (VMM) to produce physical addresses and other page tables, and this 
aims to translate the guest OS physical address to the host OS physical 
address. This process aims to ensure that each memory access operation on 
the MMU EPT automatically gets the host OS physical address from the 
results of the mapping performed by VMM. For introspection in a virtual 
machine, there are several important steps that must be taken. The first step 
to analyzing something is to collect data/evidence. Data or evidence 
collection starts with something that is easily changed (e.g., Random Access 
Memory (RAM)). Data that is in the computer RAM will be lost when the 
computer has restarted or shutdown. 
Therefore, it is important to really pay attention when the server 
computer is indicated a security incident is not to shutdown or restart the 
server, which may still hold valuable evidence. RAM itself is just a series of 
zeros and ones, with no semantic context at all. However, computer 
programs need to adjust this RAM so they can store meaningful data. For 
example, in the C programming language, a programmer can define a struct 
that determines how variables are placed in RAM. We take advantage of the 
unique Rekall approach to memory analysis, one of which is utilizing the 
appropriate debugging information provided by the operating system to 
precisely find significant kernel data structures. Currently, Rekall also 
provides cross-platform solutions, including Windows, Mac OSX, and Linux. 
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Some research on the introspection of virtual machines has been done 
by several researchers before. Pham et al. [4] introduced reliability and 
security (RnS) in the HyperTap framework to support monitoring in 
virtualization environments, especially kernel-based virtual machines (KVM). 
Researchers introduce three examples of monitoring, one of which is Guest 
OS Hang Detection (GOSHD). The researcher assumes that when the CR3 
register is disappear in a span fewer than 10 minutes and appears again then 
the guest OS can be said to be in a partial hang condition. Winarno et al. [10]      
evaluate the performance of in-VMI virtualization servers by developing 
agents as an in-VMI application and referred to as the Self-Repair Network 
(SRN) manager. Three failure scenarios are tested, one of which is hang. To 
detect hang, they use the heartbeat probes method. Lengyel et al. [11] build a 
malware analysis system that dynamically runs on virtualization (Drakvuf). 
The Drakvuf monitoring system is able to monitor rootkits in kernel-mode on 
the guest OS. Drakvuf works on the host OS to monitor guest OS by utilizing 
memory access using LibVMI, functioning as a malware detection system at 
the guest OS kernel level. 
 
3. ORIGINALITY 
In this work, we discuss the Hang detection system (system failure) on 
the guest OS. We focus on the out-VMI method, we focus on this because in 
the cloud business world it is impossible for providers to interfere to a guest 
OS that has been leased without having access rights to log in. However, the 
out-VMI method is able to provide solutions to problems of access rights, 
meaning that out-VMI can monitor many guest OSes running on Virtual 
Machines without interference the guest OS. In contrast to existing research, 
they developed a hang detection system on the Kernel-Based Virtual Machine 
(KVM) [4], and a malware detection system on Xen Hypervisor-based 
virtualization [11]. In our previous study [12], we developed a hang detection 
system on the Xen Hypervisor, and have successfully read the Control 
Register (CR3) of each process running on the guest OS as an indicator that 
the guest OS is running normally. The CR3 register is part of a memory 
register that can translate linear addresses into physical addresses when 
virtual addressing is activated. We use the CR3 register to find out all the 
Process ID (PID) that are running at the Operating System level in the guest 
OS. Furthermore, we continue our work to detect the partial hangs of the 
applications that run under the Hypervisor. 
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Table 1. Comparison of differences with existing research 
Existing 
Study 
Engine CR3 Malware Partial 
Hang 
Full 
Hang 
eVMI iVMI Framework 
Pham et al, 
2014 [4] 
KVM √ √ √ √ √  HyperTap 
Lengyel et 
al, 
2014[11] 
XEN √ √   √  LibVMI 
Winarno et 
al, 2018 
[10] 
XEN, 
KVM 
 √  √  √ SRN 
Utomo et 
al, 2020 
XEN √  √  √  LibVMI 
 
4. SYSTEM DESIGN 
This study aims to detect a partial hang on the guest OS running on a 
virtual machine based on Xen Hypervisor. We propose the use of the out-VMI 
method. In order, to get optimal results, it requires several steps starting 
from getting debug information for the guest OS kernel to the process of 
detecting a partial Hang on the guest OS. 
 
 
Figure 3. Out-VMI Architecture 
 
When the guest OS in a virtualized environment experiences problems 
in the middle of the process, the guest OS condition will never be known by 
the system administrator. Failures that occur in the guest OS can be caused 
by failures in the hardware (e.g. network connection problem) or logic 
failures (e.g. software bugs). Therefore, several guest OS monitoring 
applications appear on the hypervisor. However, it requires the installation 
of additional applications to the guest OS to send information about the 
failures that occur on the guest OS. When using the out-VMI method to 
monitor guest OS conditions, it is not necessary to install additional 
applications since the monitoring process is done from the outside of guest 
OS as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. System Design Hang Detection 
 
We developed an external virtual machine introspection (VMI) 
application that runs on the host OS to detect system failures (e.g., Hang) on 
the guest OS. The external VMI detects the system failures by reading the CR3 
register that indicates the process is running or not at the memory level. That 
is, the kernel scheduler does not forward PIDs that are running at the OS 
level to the next process that is processed at the memory level as shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
4.1 System Map 
In order to run LibVMI and read processes in memory, it requires a 
kernel symbol from each guest OS to monitor, and this is called a System Map. 
On a guest OS that uses Windows, a system map can be obtained by 
translating the kernel symbol (e.g., Ntoskrnl.exe). Furthermore, to get 
debugging information from the kernel, we need to provide a Globally Unique 
Identifier (GUID) and Database Program (PDB). In Windows guest OS, we 
could get the kernel to debug the information (e.g., GUID, PDB code) via the 
vmi-win-guid tool, which is part of LibVMI. Further, creates a debugging 
information request addressed to the Microsoft site, based on the GUID and 
PDB code that has been obtained using the Rekall application [18]. When the 
debugging information has been downloaded successfully, we do the 
conversion into a JSON file format, as shown in Figure 5. 
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However, on a guest OS based on Linux, the process to get the System 
Map occurs a bit difference. Debugging information is obtained directly from 
the guest OS itself by using the Rekall application. Afterward, the debug 
information file obtained from extracting the guest OS kernel and transferred 
to the host OS using a data transfer application (e.g., Secure Copy Protocol 
(SCP)). Furthermore, on the host OS, we convert the debug information that 
has been obtained from the guest OS into the JSON format using the Rekall 
application, as shown in Figure 6. The resulting conversion file is also 
referred to as the Rekall Profile. 
 
Figure 5. The process of getting a System map on Windows 
 
 
Figure 6. The process of getting a System Map on Linux 
 
4.2 Monitoring 
The virtual machine introspection library, known as LibVMI [11], is an 
additional project of XenAccess. LibVMI is integrated to a memory forensic in 
order to provide a simpler software so that it makes easier to support virtual 
machine introspection. This accesses memory using physical or virtual 
addresses and kernel symbols, kernel symbols obtained from the guest OS 
kernel data that are translated into files in the JSON format, as shown in 
Figure 7a. Therefore, LibVMI can provide access to physical memory for each 
Windows and Linux operating system by using the guest OS kernel symbol, as 
shown in Figure 7b. The diagram of the memory access process on this 
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virtual machine is shown in Figure 7. In addition to access the memory, 
LibVMI also supports access to memory events. LibVMI able to provides a 
notification of the list of processes that are being run, written, or read when 
the memory event on the virtual machine is accessed. Memory events require 
Hypervisor support, which is currently available on XEN and KVM. 
 
Figure 7. Kernel translation process diagram on VMI 
 
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, to read the CR3 register, it is necessary to 
translate the kernel symbol into a virtual address. LibVMI requires a System 
Map of the Guest OS that is associated with the Host OS kernel in order to 
complete the process. If the System Map file is unavailable, the guest OS 
monitoring process will fail [13]. The System Map is basically a symbol table 
and the guest OS kernel address, as shown in Figure 4. The process of 
scanning a System Map will be carried out continuously by LibVMI until the 
intended symbol is found. We use LibVMI as a solution that can provide 
access to the guest OS virtual memory and to read the guest OS virtual 
address page table, which is basically generated by the guest OS kernel. In 
every running process, the location of the page directory can change. 
Therefore, LibVMI scans the kernel task list to find the process page directory 
based on the given process ID. After finding a match, the page directory will 
get the process struct, which is in the guest OS virtual memory. 
Each PID at the guest OS has a CR3 register at the memory level. This is 
generated by the kernel scheduler when sending process signals to be 
executed in memory. We utilize the signal to simulate a partial hang, as 
shown in algorithm 1. 
 
4.3 Hang Simulation 
In the Linux operating system, the kernel has several levels of page 
tables. The top-level is the global page directory, and each process has a 
directory page. Thus each process can have a unique table mapping. Because 
the kernel manages the scheduling process, it can track changes in the page 
table, and update the CPU status needed to switch to the new process page 
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table when changing tasks. In the x86 architecture, page directories and page 
tables together provide a mapping between virtual addresses (memory 
addresses used by applications) and physical addresses (actual locations in 
physical memory hardware). When the user runs the process, the CR3 CPU 
register stores the physical address of the process page table, because each 
process has a page table, each process will also have a unique CR3 value from 
every other scheduled process. 
 
Figure 8. Paging in x86 architecture processor 
 
In a healthy guest OS, every normal process always produce a CR3 
register at the memory level. This means that the process IDs running at the 
OS level will be written continuously at the CR3 register by the process 
switch. Furthermore, each process in the guest OS has a unique page table. 
Then each running process will be scheduled by the switch to be processed at 
the memory level so that every  normal process at the OS level will always  
generate a CR3 code at the memory level. Therefore, when the CR3 register is 
not written for a period of time (e.g., 10 minutes) by a particular process 
then, the guest OS can be considered to be in a hang condition. We use the 
LibVMI library to make it easy to read the CR3 registers for each guest OS in 
memory.  Several studies have conducted approaches to hang detection on 
virtual machines (e.g., fault injection) [4][14]. 
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Figure 9. Process cycle in the operating system 
 
In general, Unix-like systems do not have a mechanism to delay the 
process and then continue. However, this can be manipulated by using the 
kill application with the SIGSTOP signal [15]. SIGSTOP signal is used to hold 
or delay the process so that the process switch does not schedule a signal to 
the page directory. As shown in Figure 9, when this SIGSTOP signal is sent to 
the process switch, the kernel will actually delay the process from the 
application (e.g., Apache2). The application process will remain in a waiting 
state until a SIGCONT signal is sent to be able to run the application process, 
although the process ID at the OS remains in the running status. However, at 
the scheduler, this process is suspended. Therefore, we use SIGSTOP to hold 
the Apache2 process signal from being sent to the process switch. As a result, 
the CR3 code of the Apache2 services is not written on the CR3 register.  
 
5. EXPERIMENT AND ANALISYS 
In this section, we will describe the results of a system failure detection 
(hang) experiment that occurred on a guest OS, the impact that occurs when 
the CR3 register reads at the memory level, and the solution to the impact 
that occurs. To support this experiment, our computer uses Debian GNU 
Linux 9.6. We compile Xen Hypervisor v4.11 as Hypervisor for its 
virtualization (Host OS). It runs on physical computer as a server with 
technical specification as follows: 
 Intel (R) Xeon (R) CPU specifications E5-2630 v4 @ 2.20GHz 
 16GiB RAM 
 1TiB HDD 
For guest OS, we use Ubuntu 16.04 and allocate 2 vCPU, 1GiB RAM, and 
20GiB virtual hard disk. 
 
5.1 Partial Hang Detection 
As explained in section 4, especially on subsection 4.3, every process 
running at the OS level has a process ID. That is, all process IDs running on 
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the OS print the CR3 register code continuously at the memory level. In this 
experiment, we ran a web server application service (Apache2) and ran a 
benchmark application (e.g., UnixBench, stress-ng). The benchmark 
application is used to force the guest OS to use all of its vCPU resources. 
Meanwhile, we monitor memory levels by reading guest OS system calls via 
the host OS. We focus our attention on the Apache2 process (PID) running on 
the guest OS, and CR3 attached to the service. As a result, monitoring the 
processes running on the guest OS will be much easier since we do not need 
any application to the Guest OS. Before performing a partial hang test, we 
first monitor the memory level to ensure that the CR3 running the Apache2 
process has been monitored from the host OS as shown in Figure 10.  
 
 
Figure 10. System monitoring produce CR3 for Apache2 
 
 
Figure 11. System monitoring not produce CR3 for Apache2 
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However, when we instructed that the Apache2 signal enters the 
waiting room with SIGSTOP, the CR3 monitoring system from the Apache2 
process is no longer printed at the memory level as shown in Figure 11. 
According to [4], when CR3 of the application or service is not printed on a 
monitoring system at the memory level for a specified time, it means that the 
guest OS is in partially hang condition. 
 
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code implementation partial hang detection 
array proclist[1..n] 
partialTime = 299 
while true do 
 result = getSignal() 
 if ( result ) then 
  procName = result.procName 
  time = result.time 
  proclist[procName]=time 
 end if 
 for key in proclist 
  haveData = true 
  result = getProcList() 
  for item in result do 
   if ( item == key ) then 
    break; 
   else 
    haveData = false 
   end if 
  end for 
  if ( haveData == false ) then 
   remove proclist[key] 
  else 
   timeDelay = Time.Now() - proclist[procName] 
   if ( timeDelay > partialTime ) then 
    Print "Partial hang..." 
   end if 
  end if 
 end for 
end while 
 
In implementing a partial hang detection system, we use an algorithm 
as shown in algorithm 1. Our system reads and checks the processed signal 
from the guest OS based on the CR3 register that appears, then establishes it 
as a list of processes. After completing registering the process that sent the 
signal, we then retrieve a list of processes from the guest OS task manager. 
We do a check between the CR3 registers generated and the list of processes 
that have been collected previously, if the name of the process is available in 
the process list it will be ignored. However, if the list of processes does not 
exist, we delete the list of processes that do not exist in the guest OS process. 
We also check the length of time the process register does not have a CR3 
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register. We set a maximum limit of 10 minutes for each process that does 
not have a CR3 register, as an indicator determining the partial hang. 
 
5.2 EPT Violation 
After we successfully indicated there was a partial hang on the Apache2 
application. A new problem arises when we read the process in memory. The 
workload of the guest vCPU OS moves partially to the host vCPU OS. This 
situation known as EPT violation. 
 
 
Figure 12. Monitoring the guest OS vCPU usage 
 
EPT violation is detected when we monitor vCPU workloads using 
monitoring tools (e.g,, Xentop) [20]. The monitoring process is started before 
reading the memory until resuming the SIGSTOP process performed on 
Apache2. As shown in Figure 12, the percentage of vCPU usage in the guest 
OS before reading memory with the guest OS status running the benchmark 
application reaches 199.9%; this is shown in the yellow rectangle. Moreover, 
the blue rectangle shows the percentage of use of host OS vCPU with the load 
running dom0 and one domU (guest OS) by 3.0%. 
However, when we monitored memory, the percentage of vCPU usage 
on the guest OS dropped dramatically to 0.5%. It can be seen in the green 
rectangle in Figure 13; the use of host OS vCPU has increased to 105.3%. 
There is a shift of workload from the guest OS to the host OS, and this is 
called EPT Violation [4]. 
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Figure 13. EPT Violation 
 
5.3 Xen Alternate p2m 
Altp2m is a Xen subsystem and stands for alternative guest physical 
memory to machine physical [19]. The term p2m refers to the second level 
address translation table, which translates the physical guest address (p) into 
a physical host or in the Xen jargon machine address (m). Usually, there is 
one p2m table per guest domain that is managed by Xen. This has been 
changed with an alternative p2m table. On x86 or more precisely on modern 
Intel architecture, p2m tables can be considered as EPT tables represented 
by Extended Page Table Pointers (EPTP) in data structures that are 
determined by the Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) hardware. The 
altp2m system can define multiple page tables for each guest OS that allows 
synchronization between vCPUs. Therefore, it can minimize EPT violations in 
the Hypervisor. Since the Haswell CPU generation, Intel's VMCS has been able 
to maintain 512 EPTPs. We try to use altp2m on Xen 4.12.1 version as shown 
in Figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 14. Prosentase vCPU with alt2pm 
 
As a result, when monitoring EPT violations can be minimized. 
Previously the percentage of vCPU Host OS reached 105.3% as shown in 
Figure 12. However, since using altp2m it has become 24.0% with the same 
testing load as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. System Experiment result 
Domain Percentage vCPU Before monitoring During monitoring With altp2m 
Host OS 3.0% 105.3% 24.0% 
Guest OS 199.9% 0.5% 175.8% 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents monitoring and detection of partial hangs in a 
hypervisor-based virtualization environment (e.g. Xen) with a virtual 
machine introspection (VMI) method that is more specific to out-VMI. Our 
proposed system is able to monitor multiple guest OSes without installing 
additional applications (agentless). We conducted a simulation for the Hang 
experiment using a SIGSTOP signal for 10 minutes. As a result, the SIGSTOP 
signal gives the scheduler instructions to pause the Apache2 application 
process so as not to forward it to the memory level, and the Apache2 PID is 
still running at the operating system level. We conclude that our experiment 
was able to detect a partial Hang on the guest OS. However, when LibVMI 
monitors the CR3 register, a process shift from the guest OS to the host OS 
occurs, known as a violation of the EPT. Therefore, we are trying to update to 
a newer version of Xen. Alternate p2m (altp2m) is able to minimize the 
occurrence of EPT violations when monitoring memory. We will try to 
improve our work by adding a self-action model to respond to failures that 
occur on the guest OS (e.g. Hang) in the future. One of the self-action models 
is called the Self-Repair Network model [17]. Moreover, the failures not only 
addresses hang but also other failures such as Malware and Denial of Service 
(DoS). 
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